Topic Area: Fisheries
Geographic Area:South Atlantic
Focal Question: What is the role of ITQs in the management of
a fishery?
Sources:
(1) Gauvin, John R., et al. 1994. "Description and Evaluation of the
Wreckfish Fishery Under Individual Transferable Quotas." Marine
Resource Economics 9(2): 99-118. (2) Copes, Parzival. 1986. "A
Critical Review Of The Individual Quota in Fisheries Management."
Land Economics 62(3): 278-291.
Reviewer: Jonathan F. Nykvist, Colby College '97
Review:
The wreckfish (Polyprion Americanus) is a member of the temperate
bass family and is closely related to the striped bass. It is found
off the coast of Georgia at depths of 500 - 800 meters, about 300
meters deeper than traditional Southern Atlantic fish such as
snappers or groupers. It resembles a grouper in size and appearance,
with most wreckfish weighing in at around 30 pounds. The first
wreckfish caught in the southern Atlantic was in the early 1980's; it
was caught by mistake when a fisherman was using long-line to try to
recover some lost equipment. The discovery of this large grouper-like
fish was welcome as many of the other fisheries in the south Atlantic
were already overfished and overexploited.
Since then, the wreckfish fishery has attracted more and more
speculative fishermen. Because it was a relatively new fishery, it
was not yet regulated in any way. Thus, it was treated as an open
access fishery and many over-exploitation problems arose. During the
late 1980's, it began to expand exponentially. Consider the following
table:
Year
|
Vessels
|
Catch (lbs.)
|
1987
|
2
|
<30,000
|
1988
|
6
|
>300,000
|
1989
|
25
|
>2,000,000
|
1990
|
>40
|
>4,000,000
|
By 1990, the wreckfish fishery had become one of the largest revenue
per trip fishing opportunities in the Southeast. It was expanding so
rapidly that it was out of control.
In 1990, the South Atlantic Fisheries Management Council (SAFMC), a
federally funded agency, attempted to bring the fishery back under
control. They initially placed a cap on the Total Allowable Catch
(TAC) at 2 million pounds. However, this only caused an increase in
the pace of fishing. In fact, the TAC limit of 2 million pounds was
met in the first two months of the 1990 season. The large number of
fish caught in such a short period of time flooded the market for
wreckfish and brought dockside prices to an all-time low. It also led
to intense conflicts between the fisherman. While the TAC system did
limit catch, it did not increase income or reduce overcapitaliztion.
Thus, it was clear that the TAC method was not a valid approach to
bring the fishery under control.
The SAFMC further analyzed the nature of the fishery and realized
that a few factors made it a perfect candidate for an Individual
Transferable Quota (ITQ) system. Namely: (1) the single-species
nature of the fishery (wreckfish fisherman would only on occasion
pull in a dolphinfish as well), (2) the relatively small number of
participants (other comparable fisheries had over 1500 participants),
and (3) the absence of a recreational component. Thus, after much
research, the SAFMC decided to implement an ITQ system.
Under the ITQ system, a quota establishes the total number of
allowable fish caught, just like with the TAC system. However, each
fisherman receives permits representing a certain percentage of this
quota. In the wreckfish fishery, 50 percent of these permits were
allocated to the existing vessels based on documented historical
catch over the 1987-1990 period, and the remaining 50 percent were
divided equally among all existing vessels. This struck a balance
between those who were relatively new to the fishery and those who
had been fishing from the beginning. Any new vessel would have to buy
a quota to enter the wreckfish fishery. These quotas are made
completely transferable, which allows the fishermen to sell them if
they have a surplus, or buy them if they have a strong need. For the
initial allocation, no single business entity was allowed to receive
more than 10 percent of the total quota. The permits were said to be
of "indefinite duration," meaning that if the program was not going
as planned, the SAFMC had the right to recall them.
The objectives of the ITQ system were well defined by the SAFMC. The
economic incentives included decreasing the harvest pace, and
decreasing the overcapitalization of the fleet. Some of the other
objectives included decreasing conflicts among fisherman, creating
incentives for compliance with fishery regulations, and incentives
for conservation.
A main source of contention the SAFMC faced when planning the ITQ
system was whether or not to place any restrictions on the maximum
number of permits that one business entity could obtain after
the initial allocation. Some people argued that without a cap,
one business entity could obtain significant market power, thus being
able to restrict supply and increase prices. However, it was argued
that many fisherman would not be willing to sell their permits as
they now had a vested interest in the fishery. Also, wreckfish are
generally marketed as a grouper substitute, so that even if one party
did obtain all of the allowable permits, they still would not be able
to obtain significant market power due to the large numbers of
groupers and other grouper substitutes. Thus, they decided to
continue as planned without imposing this cap.
The results of the implementation of the ITQ system are fairly clear.
Overcapitalization was clearly reduced by the tradable permit scheme.
When the ITQ's were first implemented in April of 1992, there were 49
shareholders. By August of the same year, that number had decreased
to 37, and by June of 1993, only 31 permit-holders remained. This has
lead to efficiency gains for the fisherman. They no longer have the
incentives to land as many fish as possible in the early part of the
season as they did under the TAC system. Thus, the fishermen have
applied less effort in the early months of the season, when the
fishing is generally a bit less productive. Consolidation has clearly
occurred, but for the same reasons that were mentioned above, this
consolidation has not lead to monopoly power. In fact, consolidation
was a necessary condition for efficiency, as the predicted
economically efficient number of vessels in the wreckfish fishery is
20.
The market prices of wreckfish prior to the ITQ management program
varied from $.90 to $1.55 per pound, with the mean approximately
$1.20 per pound. This large variation in market price reflected the
times when the market was flooded (in the early months under the TAC
system) and prices depressed, and when the market was dry (in the
later months), and prices were high. After the implementation of
ITQ's, prices increased slightly to a mean of approximately $1.85 per
pound and the variation around this mean decreased greatly.
Although the effects on conservation incentives are somewhat harder
to observe, a few results of the ITQ implementation seem to signal
that conservation incentives have improved. The first manifested
itself at public hearings that were held once a year after the TAC
system was implemented. Before the ITQ system was implemented, the
fisherman were constantly arguing for increases in the Total
Allowable Catch. However, after the ITQ's were set up, there was a
blatant absence of any lobbying for increases in the Total Allowable
Catch, thus seeming to indicate that the fishermen had a vested
interest in the conservation of the wreckfish fishery for future
purposes. Secondly, compliance with the quotas seems high. Since the
implementation, there has only been one report of a vessel quota
"busting," that is, exceeding their allowable quotas and not
reporting them.
The discount rate is also a good indicator of whether conservation
incentives exist. The discount rate, or rate of time preference,
associated with a Free Access, Common Property resource is infinity.
After the ITQ program, the discount rate measured in the wreckfish
fishery was 150 percent. This was measured by taking the present
value of a permit (price =$0.30) discounted over an infinite time
period and setting it equal to $0.50, which was the price of a share,
or a permanent harvest right. While this is clearly not infinity, it
is still relatively high, indicating that conservation incentives may
not be as prevalent as described above. One explanation for this
relatively high discount rate is the "indefinite" nature of the
permits. That is, if the fishermen feel that the program could be
rescinded in the near future, they no longer have a vested interest
in the fishery, and conservation effects are not as great. However,
regardless of the relatively high discount rate of 150 percent, it is
extremely clear that the ITQ system is much more effective on
conservation than is Open Access or Total Allowable Catch.
The conflicts between fishermen that were becoming prevalent under
both the Open Access and Total Allowable Catch systems seem to have
been virtually eliminated with the ITQ system. After the ITQ system
was in place, arguments about gear and general fishing practices
between fishermen were significantly reduced. This is probably a
result of the elimination of the confrontational open access
fishery.
Thus, overall, the move of the wreckfish fishery to an Individual
Transferable Quota system from Open Access and Total Allowable Catch
systems has clearly had positive effects on the fishery. Most of the
objectives set forth by the SAFMC are being realized to some degree.
The wreckfish fishery is a good example that an ITQ system can work,
and should be used as a reference for any other fishery considering
the implementation of an Individual Transferable Quota System.
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