Topic Area: Industrial
Structure
Geographic Area: China
Focal Question: How does the
ownership structure of Chinese firms affect their environmental performance?
Sources: 1. Wang, Hua and Yanhong
Jin. “Industrial Ownership and Environmental Performance: Evidence from
China.” World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2936. December 2002.
Reviewer: Spencer C. Hutchins ’03
Review:
Over
the past few decades, China has begun major reforms to their state-owned
industries as they liberalize their economic system and allow for different
forms of ownership. This study,
currently a working paper for the World Bank, focuses on the various
environmental track records of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE), Community Owned
Enterprises (COE), Privately Owned Enterprises (POE), and Foreign Directly
Invested companies (FDI). To
do this, the authors focus on three Chinese regions, Danyang of the Jiangsu Province, Liupanshui of the Guizhou Province and the
Northern Tianjian Municipality.
Within these provinces, approximately 1000 firms were studied in the
year of 2000 and detailed production information was gathered.
This
study, and the succeeding analysis, focuses on the environmental effects of
ownership structure. Prior to the
empirical research, the authors discus previous work in the field, and then
delve into theoretical incentives for pollution control. What makes this analysis both
interesting and difficult is that there appears to be different incentives
working at cross purposes to one another.
SOEs are theoretically most likely to internalize nation wide
externalities, COEs are likely to do the same, but only for community level
externalities, and POEs and FDIs are unlikely to consider these costs at
all. However, POEs and FDI are
more likely to be efficiently run, which may result in superior technology or
methods, decreasing pollution. An
additional factor they examine is the relationship between a firm and the body
responsible for its regulation.
POEs and FDIs are unlikely to have significant bargaining position,
whereas SOEs are likely to have intimate connections with a regulatory agency,
since they are both state owned; COEs likely fall somewhere in-between.
To
model a company’s pollution discharge decision, the authors assume that a
company will attempt to minimize three potential costs: 1) total factor cost, including costs
associated with pollution abatement. 2) total cost of penalties paid for regulatory
penalties. And 3) total social cost of pollution. POEs and FDIs are likely to only consider costs 1 and 2,
whereas to varying degrees, SOEs and COEs will consider all three. The theoretical analysis, using this
framework, is inconclusive because regulatory, internalization, and efficiency
dynamics work at cross purposes with each other. Ultimately, the authors conclude that only empirical work
can ascertain the relative weight of these effects.
After
a brief historical description of China’s environmental regulatory
environment, Wang and Jin describe the methodology behind their survey. The
three regions chosen (Northern
Tianjin, Danyang, and Liupanshui), were done so because of social and economic
differences, the wide variety of industry in those areas, and because the government
was willing to cooperate with the study.
Sources for the data included municipal environmental agencies, questionnaires
to each plant’s employee responsible for environmental regulations, and a
survey of plant managers.
There were numerous initial indications from the data. SOEs are generally much larger than other firms, and have
much higher concentrations of air pollution. COEs, while fairly good on most pollutants, had high levels
of total suspended solids (TSS) in their water pollution, but POEs had the highest
combined total of all water pollutants.
SOEs and joint venture FDIs (largely because of their SOE components)
most often violated emissions standard and COEs did so the most rarely. Additionally, COEs were the only firms to avoid any community
complaints and POEs were the more likely to be inspected by regulators.
To
further analyze the survey data, the authors developed an econometric analysis
of the pollution discharge intensity.
Using techniques from previous studies, the authors identified three
determinants to be included in the analysis: Environmental policy and external
pressure (e.g. level of environmental fines), Input prices (e.g. coal and water
prices), and Characteristics (e.g. location and scale). The econometric results were done for
two types of water pollution, total suspended solids (TSS) and chemical oxygen
demand (COD). Results show that
citizen complaints have a strong negative correlation with TSS intensity, indicating
that community pressure creates strong incentives for companies to improve
pollution abatement. The level of
pollution charge also results in a significant reduction in both types of
pollution, evidence which the
authors cite as consistent with other studies. While there are other results discussed on variables
ranging from water to electricity price,
the most important information comes from the analysis on firm ownership
structure’s effect on pollution levels. The study finds that for TSS’s, SOE’s are the
most polluting, followed by POEs, COEs, then FDIs. For COD, results are not statistically significant.
The empirical
work done by the authors allows them to draw several important conclusions,
which confirm much of the existing literature. Ownership structure dos have an affect on pollution levels. Through
surveys and econometric analysis, it is clear to the authors that state owned
businesses have the worst environmental track record, with domestically owned
private firms coming in second.
The best performers were foreign owned companies. Community owned businesses
significantly outperformed private or state owned domestic firms, likely
because they were more likely in practice to internalize community-level
externalities.
These results suggest that economic liberalization, and through that a greater role for foreign owned businesses, may indeed have significant positive environmental effects due to efficiency and technology improvements that those types of firms are likely to employ. Those effects on pollution levels currently overwhelm additional internalization pressure that domestically owned firms face, making foreign owned companies the cleanest industrial structure operating in China.