Language, Culture, and Moral Development: A Vygotskian Perspective

Mark B. Tappan

Education and Human Development, Colby College

This article outlines a sociocultural perspective on the study of moral development. Grounded in Vygotsky's exploration of the developmental relationship between speech and thinking, it highlights the semiotic mediation of moral functioning via inner speech as inner moral dialogue, the social origins of moral functioning, and the sociocultural situatedness of moral development. In so doing it not only gives rise to a very different account of the process of moral development from that offered by other theoretical perspectives currently en vogue in the field of moral development—notably, the cognitive-developmental paradigm—but also addresses questions about the origins of moral sensibility and questions about differences in moral functioning that currently plague researchers and theoreticians alike. © 1997 Academic Press

The past decade or so has been a turbulent time in the field of moral development. New questions have been raised about the origins of moral sensibility in young children—questions that echo old debates about the influence of nature vs. nurture, biology vs. culture, in the developmental process. Mounting evidence suggests that young children from many different cultures display some kind of moral sensibility as they approach the age of two (Kagan & Lamb, 1987). But is this "preoccupation with correct behavior, anxiety following the violation of adult prohibitions, and empathy with another's distress part of a universal hominid ontogeny, or are these phenomena different from the child's learning to wave 'bye-bye'?" (Kagan, 1987, p. x), and thus the product of coincidental socialization patterns? Convincing evidence can be marshaled in support of both positions, and the debate continues.

Carol Gilligan's (1982, 1983) critique that prevailing theories of moral development—Freud's (1923/1960), Piaget's (1932/1965), and, most importantly, Kohlberg's (1981, 1984)—are flawed because they systematically excluded women's experience from foundational theory-building research studies, and her claim that theories of moral development must acknowledge and include the "different voice" of care and responsiveness that emerge from studies of girls' and women's moral experience, have also challenged many of the fundamental assumptions of the field, and have generated much discussion and debate, as well as conflicting empirical findings (Baumrin, 1986; Brabeck, 1983; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987; Pratt, Golding, & Hunter, 1984; Walker, 1984, 1986). Gilligan's work has thus raised profound questions about the ways in which differences—not only in gender, but also, by extension, in race, class, and culture—shape and influence processes of moral development across the lifespan.

Needless to say, questions about origins and questions about differences are intertwined in complex and complicated ways. For the field of moral development to move forward, however, both sets of questions must be fully addressed.

To do so, I believe, we must consider another important critical challenge that has been leveled against prevailing theories of human development over the past decade or so—the interest in, and concern about, culture and context that is increasingly exhibited by scholars exploring a wide range of phenomena (Bruner, 1986, 1990; Cole, 1988; Jahoda, 1992; Rogoff & Wertsch, 1984; Rogoff & Chavajay, 1995; Rogoff & Lave, 1984; Shweder, 1991; Stigler, Shweder, & Herdt, 1990; Winegar & Valsiner, 1992). This challenge represents an attempt to move beyond theories that assume the processes, dynamics, and endpoints of human development are universal—transcultural and ahistorical—toward an explicit consideration of the role that the sociocultural-historical context plays in giving rise to human action and interaction. Influenced largely by work of Lev Vygotsky (1934/1986, 1978), sociocultural scholars have focused sustained attention on the ways in which "mediational means"—i.e., physical tools and "semiotic tools" (primarily language), appropriated from the social world—necessarily shape human mental functioning (see Wertsch, 1985, 1991).

Vygotsky's focus on the semiotic mediation of higher psychological functioning has important implications for developmental questions about origins and about differences. It provides the key, in fact, both to interesting ideas about development (defined "in terms of the emergence and transformation of forms of mediation"), and to critical insights about the origins of higher psychological functioning (found in social processes and social interactions that "necessarily involve mediational mechanisms") (Wertsch, 1985, pp. 14–15). And it is Vygotsky's recognition and understanding of the influence of culture, broadly defined, on "mediated action" that allows for a respectful consideration of the effect of social, cultural, and historical differences on the formation and transformation of higher psychological functioning across the lifespan (Wertsch, 1991).

Thus far Vygotsky's sociocultural perspective has been applied almost
VYGOTSKY: SPEECH AND THINKING

Vygotsky’s (1978) well-known claim that the development of higher psychological functioning occurs when “an operation that initially represents an external activity is reconstructed and begins to occur internally” (pp. 56–57) is illuminated most clearly in his exploration of the relationship between young children’s speech and thinking. This exploration, focusing particular attention on the phenomenon of “inner speech,” is contained in Vygotsky’s (1934/1986) final work, Thought and Language—conceived, at least in part, as a challenge to Piaget’s (1923/1959, 1924/1969) groundbreaking studies of thought and language in early childhood.

Piaget labeled children’s “private” speech (talking out loud to themselves) “egocentric” because it reflected, he believed, the developmentally immature nature of the child’s thinking (her inability to take the perspective of others, her lack of interest in communicating with others, “the absence,” in short, “of any sustained social intercourse . . . [or genuine] social life between children of less than seven or eight” [Piaget, 1923/1959, p. 40]). Piaget thus argued that egocentric speech serves no positive function in the child’s development (it is simply an epiphenomenon, in other words, of her egocentric thinking), and he claimed that cognitive development proceeds (and hence egocentric speech declines) as the child becomes increasingly socialized.

Vygotsky (1934/1986) challenged Piaget on all counts, arguing, instead, that private speech plays a very important role in the child’s development. Egocentric speech, he claimed, functions as an “instrument of thought” in its own right, serving as a “tool” that helps the child plan activities and solve problems. As such, it is clearly more than a simple “by-product” of the child’s cognitive immaturity. Rather, it represents a developmental intermediary between social speech and inner speech: “when egocentric speech disappears,” Vygotsky argued, “it does not simply atrophy but ‘goes underground,’ i.e., turns into inner speech” (pp. 32–33).2

In contrast, therefore, to Piaget’s conception of cognitive development, which entails a move “from nonverbal autistic thought through egocentric thought and speech to socialized speech and logical thinking” (p. 36), the hypothesis Vygotsky proposed (“first social, then egocentric, then inner speech”) “reverses this course” (p. 35). Thus the fundamental difference between Vygotsky’s account and Piaget’s concerns the direction of development (see also Glassman, 1994). Private or egocentric speech in young children was of particular interest for Vygotsky not because it represents the child’s attempt to externalize inner (egocentric) thoughts (Piaget’s view), but rather because it captures the process by which the child internalizes external verbal/social interactions, as she moves from social speech to inner speech.3

“The true direction of the development of thinking,” argued Vygotsky (1934/1986), “is not from the individual to the social, but from the social to the individual” (p. 36).

Inner speech thus provides a prime example, for Vygotsky, of how external, interpersonal relations become internal, intrapsychological processes. As the move from communicative speech to egocentric speech to inner speech occurs, the ways in which what was originally a communicative function becomes a uniquely individual inner mental function are revealed. Two interrelated aspects of Vygotsky’s (1934/1986) analysis of inner speech deserve

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1 I use the term “Vygotskian” here to acknowledge that the perspective I present in this essay is not, strictly speaking, Vygotsky’s own, but rather it is a perspective that draws from and extends central aspects of Vygotsky’s work. Vygotsky himself never studied moral development; moreover, his untimely early death meant that many of his most important ideas were left for others to develop and elaborate more fully. “Sociocultural!” (Wertsch, 1991; Wertsch, del Rio, & Alvarez, 1995), “sociohistorical!” (Cole, 1988), and “neo Vygotskian” (Tharp & Gallimore, 1988) are all terms that have been proposed to acknowledge both the critical impetus provided by Vygotsky’s initial empirical and theoretical work, and the subsequent elaboration and extension of that work by others. Because I do not draw in any significant way on the work of other “first-generation” sociocultural scholars (e.g., Bakhtin, Leont’ev, Luria, Mead, Volosinov) in this essay, the term “Vygotskian” seems most appropriate in this context.  

2 There is a large and impressive research literature on private speech in childhood that both supports and, in some cases, challenges Vygotsky’s initial claims in this area (see Berk, 1986; Diaz & Berk, 1992; Frauneglass & Diaz, 1985; Zivin, 1979). Virtually all of this research was “inspired” by the work of Kohlberg, Yaeger, & Hjertholm (1968), whose initial replication of Vygotsky’s research “offered confirming evidence that private speech is linked to early social experience, follows a developmental path proceeding toward internalization, and is augmented by task difficulty” (Berk, 1992, p. 26). 

3 “Egocentric speech,” Vygotsky claimed, “provides the key to the study of inner speech” (p. 226), because “speech is interiorized psychologically before it is interiorized physically” (p. 86). Thus egocentric speech is inner speech in function, but not in form—“external in its mode of expression, but at the same time it is inner speech in its function and structure” (pp. 226–227). As such, egocentric speech provides a “natural experiment” for studying inner speech.
brief mention in this regard—the "peculiar" syntactical and semantic characteristics of inner speech, and the impact of the "historical-cultural process" on the development of "verbal thought."

When it is compared to external speech, Vygotsky argued, the syntax of inner speech appears to be disconnected and incomplete, full of "shortcuts" and abbreviations—specifically "omitting the subject of a sentence and all words connected with it, while preserving the predicate" (p. 236). This tendency toward predication, moreover, is an ineluctable product of the developmental history of inner speech:

In the beginning, egocentric speech is identical in structure with social speech, but in the process of its transformation into inner speech, it gradually becomes less complete and coherent as it becomes governed by an almost entirely predictive syntax. . . . The child talks about the things he sees or hears or does at a given moment. As a result, he tends to leave out the subject [i.e., himself] and all words connected with it, condensing his speech more and more until only predicates are left. The more differentiated the specific function of egocentric speech becomes, the more pronounced are its syntactic peculiarities—simplification and predication. Hand in hand with this change goes decreasing vocalization. When we converse with ourselves, we need [very few] words. . . . Inner speech is speech almost without words. (pp. 243–244)

Because both syntax and sound are thus reduced to a minimum in inner speech, semantics becomes particularly crucial. Consequently, Vygotsky claimed, there are three primary "semantic peculiarities" of inner speech that deserve careful attention.

The first is the primacy of the sense of a word over its meaning. Sense is the "sum of all the psychological events aroused in our consciousness by the word . . . a dynamic, fluid, complex whole" (pp. 244–245); meaning, in contrast, is generalized, abstract, and thus, ultimately, limited. In inner speech, therefore, what is primary is the sense of a word as it is used in a particular context, not its precise meaning as contained, for example, in a dictionary. The second is the tendency, in inner speech, toward "agglutination"—combining several words and/or phrases into one new word that "not only expresses a rather complex idea, but designates all the separate elements contained in that idea" (p. 246). The third is what Vygotsky called the "influx of sense," whereby, in inner speech, the senses of different words flow into and influence one another, such that, ultimately, "a single word is so saturated with sense that . . . it becomes a concentrate of sense. To unfold it into overt speech, one would need a multitude of words" (p. 247). This is, in effect, literary metonymy in the context of inner speech.

Finally, Vygotsky suggested that these unique syntactic and semantic characteristics combine to give inner speech a decidedly idiomatic quality. This is similar to the process that occurs between persons in close psychological contact (e.g., sisters and/or brothers, members of gangs, military personnel), wherein "words acquire special meanings understood only by the initi-

ated" (p. 248). "In inner speech," argued Vygotsky, "the same kind of idiom develops—the kind that is difficult to translate into the language of ordinary communicative speech . . . [because] one word stands for a number of thoughts and feelings, and sometimes substitutes for a long and profound discourse" (p. 248).

Let me turn, now, to Vygotsky's analysis of the impact of the "historical-cultural process" on the development of "verbal thought." Vygotsky postulated that speech and thought initially develop along separate and distinct lines in very young children—at first, speech is nonintellectual and thought is nonverbal. At some point, however, the two paths meet, and verbal thought emerges. This is a turning point in ontogenesis—from here onward speech is inextricably linked to thinking, such that "the speech structures mastered by the child [in inner speech] become the basic structures of his thinking" (p. 94).

At the same time, however, because language is a cultural product, socio-cultural-historical processes also necessarily enter the developmental picture:

The child's intellectual growth is contingent on his mastering the social means of thought, that is, language. . . . If we compare the early development of speech and intellect—which, as we have seen, develop along separate lines both in animals and in very young children—with the development of inner speech and verbal thought, we must conclude that the latter stage is not a simple continuation of the earlier. The nature of the development itself changes, from biological to sociohistorical. Verbal thought is not an innate, natural form of behavior, but is determined by a historical-cultural process and has specific properties and laws that cannot be found in the natural forms of thought and speech. Once we acknowledge the historical character of verbal thought, we must consider it subject to all of the premises . . . which are valid for any historical phenomenon in human society. (pp. 94–95)

Thus, concluded Vygotsky, "the problem of thought and language . . . extends beyond the limits of natural science and becomes the focal problem of historical human psychology" (p. 95).

This brings me back, finally, to the question I posed at the outset of this essay: What might a sociocultural perspective on the study of moral development entail, building on these central aspects of Vygotsky's theoretical and empirical work? I would suggest that such a perspective would entail four central assumptions:

1) moral functioning (like all "higher psychological functioning") is necessarily mediated by words, language, and forms of discourse;
2) such mediation occurs primarily in private or inner speech, typically in the form of inner moral dialogue;
3) because language is the social medium par excellence, processes of social communication and social relations necessarily give rise to moral functioning;
4) because words, language, and forms of discourse are inherently sociocultural phenomena, moral development is always shaped by the particular social, cultural, and historical context in which it occurs.

Let me now explore each of these assumptions in some detail.
THE SEMIOTIC MEDIATION OF MORAL FUNCTIONING

Key to Vygotsky’s theoretical perspective is his claim that in order to understand the mind we must understand the “tools” that mediate and shape its functioning (see Wertsch, 1985). Beginning with an idea borrowed from Marx and Engels, that all genuinely human activity is necessarily mediated by tools, Vygotsky moved to a consideration of the role that “psychological tools,” or “signs,” play in human mental life. Ultimately, Vygotsky focused his attention on language as the most important psychological tool, because language, by definition, has both semiotic and communicative characteristics. When a psychological tool, like language, begins to play a part in a particular mental function (i.e., begins to mediate that function), that function, Vygotsky argued, is fundamentally transformed:

By being included in the process of behavior, the psychological tool alters the entire flow and structure of mental functions. It does this by determining the structure of a new instrumental act, just as a technical tool alters the process of a natural adaptation by determining the form of labor operations. (Vygotsky, 1981b, p. 137)

Psychological tools, for Vygotsky (1978), do not simply facilitate the operation of existing mental tasks; rather, the introduction of new psychological tools fundamentally transforms and reorganizes a given function. Recall that for Vygotsky this transformation is particularly salient in early childhood, when, with the advent of egocentric speech (as an intermediate step toward inner speech), language begins to be used as an “instrument of thought” in its own right, a “tool” that helps the child plan activities and solve problems:

The most significant moment in the course of intellectual development, which gives birth to the purely human forms of practical and abstract intelligence, occurs when speech and practical activity, two previously independent lines of development, converge. (p. 24)

Thus Vygotsky’s conception of semiotic mediation profoundly shapes his view of the developmental process: he does not envision ontogenesis as a series of incremental quantitative changes, but rather as a series of fundamental qualitative transformations or “revolutions” associated with changes in the psychological tools to which the person has access (Wertsch, 1985).

This view of the semiotic (i.e., linguistic) mediation of mental functioning is critical, I would argue, to understanding the process of moral development. Moral action (acting when faced with the question “What is the right or the ‘moral’ thing to do in this situation?”) is fundamentally and irreducibly mediated action. By this I mean that for an action to be considered “moral,” either by an actor or by an observer, a particular sense must be associated with that action. This obtains whether that action is as “instinctive” as rushing out into busy traffic to rescue a wayward child, or as “deliberative” as weighing the pros and cons of having an abortion. In either case, and in the myriad of others, both mundane and exemplary, that inhabit the moral do-

main, because the designation “moral” is an interpretation of the action in question, generated from the shared assumptions and understandings that constitute culture, moral functioning can never be unmediated. Rather, it is always accomplished with the use of “psychological tools” (most importantly, words, language, and forms of moral discourse) that enable the person to think, feel, and act in a particular way—that is, in a way that, in her particular sociocultural context, is understood to be “moral” or “immoral.”

The crucial element here, from a Vygotskian perspective, is the link between morality and language. To make this link more explicit, let me turn momentarily to the work of Michael Oakeshott (1975). Oakeshott argues that morality is fundamentally a “practice” or a form of “conduct” (an activity) that facilitates human interaction: “The conditions which compose a moral practice are not theorems or precepts about human conduct, nor do they constitute anything so specific as a ‘shared system of values’; they compose a vernacular language of colloquial intercourse (p. 63; emphasis added). This language, claims Oakeshott, is thus fundamentally pragmatic; it is a tool used “like any other language, as an instrument of self-disclosure . . . by agents in diagnosing their situations and choosing their responses; and it is a language of self-enactment which permits those who can use it to understand themselves and one another” (p. 63):

A morality, then, is neither a system of general principles nor a code of rules, but a vernacular language. General principles and even rules may be elicited from it, but (like other languages) it is not the creation of grammarians; it is made by speakers. . . . It is not a device for formulating judgments about conduct or for solving so-called moral problems, but a practice in terms of which to think, to choose, to act, and to utter. (pp. 78–79)

Moral functioning understood, therefore, as a “practical activity” (what we might call “moral activity”), is mediated by a vernacular moral language that fundamentally shapes the ways in which persons think, feel, and act. This vernacular moral language, moreover, is shared by persons who share the same activities, who are engaged in similar social/moral practices. And it is these shared activities that enable persons to understand the predicated forms of speech by means of which they communicate about moral issues with themselves and with each other—if they did not share these activities they would not share a common moral language. While Vygotsky’s (1934/1986) example of communication carried on by means of a common vernacular language that emerges from shared activity is somewhat more mundane—a conversation, reported by Dostoevsky, between six drunken workmen that consisted entirely of the same single epithet, repeated in different tones and inflections—it nevertheless illustrates quite well the process by which com-

4 In this vein, I would argue that the moral agent can not be understood simply as an individual actor, but must, instead, be seen as an “individual-acting-with-mediational-means” (Wertsch, 1991).
mon, everyday words (in both inner and outer speech) mediate thought, feeling, and action.

Within the field of moral development, Carol Gilligan and her colleagues have presented the most compelling evidence to date regarding the ways in which vernacular moral languages and forms of moral discourse mediate and shape persons' responses to moral problems, conflicts, and dilemmas in their lives. They have distinguished two different moral "voices"—"justice" and "care"—that are common in the U.S. during the late 20th century, and they have documented the existence of these voices in persons' narratives of real-life moral conflict and choice (see Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor, 1988; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987; also Brown, Debold, Tappan, & Gilligan, 1992; Brown, Tappan, Gilligan, Miller, & Argyris, 1989). In addition, Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) report that when asked to describe a moral problem or conflict they had recently faced, more than two-thirds of a group of 80 educationally advantaged adolescents and adults living in the U.S. represented considerations of both justice and care in their interview narratives. This suggests that justice and care represent two fundamentally different moral languages or forms of moral discourse, that persons can speak in the language of both justice and care, and that persons therefore can and do use both voices (as "psychological tools") to help them respond to moral problems and conflicts in their lives (see also Tappan, 1992).

If moral functioning/activity (like all "higher psychological functioning") is indeed mediated by words, language, and forms of discourse, then inner speech must play a primary role in that process. It is, therefore, to a consideration of this second aspect of a Vygotskian perspective on moral development that I now turn.

INNER SPEECH AS INNER MORAL DIALOGUE

While Vygotsky postulated a variety of means by which mental life is semiotically mediated, he focused primary attention on the ways in which language, in the form of inner speech (with its unique syntactic and semantic qualities) functions as a psychological tool. Just, therefore, as children learn to count first by using fingers, blocks, or other "manipulatives" before being able to count in their heads, they learn to speak first to others (parents, siblings, friends) before learning to speak to themselves, in inner speech. Once this is accomplished, however, verbal thought becomes possible, the nature of development changes from being biologically determined to being socioculturally shaped, and there is a radical shift in the richness and complexity of consciousness.

It is unclear whether Vygotsky viewed monologue or dialogue as the fundamental characteristic of inner speech. Nevertheless, the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (1981) and his colleague Valentin Volosinov (1929/1986), as well as that of George Herbert Mead (1934, 1936), can be used to extend Vygotsky's insights in this regard, by focusing, explicitly, on the dialogic nature of inner speech (see also Emerson, 1986; Morson & Emerson, 1990). For Bakhtin, Volosinov, and Mead, inner speech never consists of pure monologue, in which a person simply talks in a single, solitary "voice." Rather, there is always a dialogue between at least two voices—a dialogue that mediates and shapes human mental functioning in profound ways (see Day & Tappan, 1996).

Bakhtin (1981) focuses on the fundamentally dialogic character of all speech:

In the makeup of almost every utterance spoken by a social person—from a brief response in a casual dialogue to major verbal-ideological works (literary, scholarly and others)—a significant number of words can be identified that are implicitly or explicitly admitted as someone else's, and that are transmitted by a variety of different means. Within the arena of almost every utterance an intense interaction between one's own and another's word is being waged, a process in which they oppose or dialogically intersect each other. (p. 354-355)

Volosinov (1929/1986) focuses explicitly on the dialogic character of inner speech:

Close analysis would show that the units of which inner speech is constituted resemble the alternating lines of a dialogue. There was good reason therefore why thinkers in ancient times should have conceived of inner speech as inner dialogue. (p. 38; emphasis in original)

Mead (1936) focuses, similarly, on the genuinely 'conversational' quality of inner speech:

There is a field, a sort of inner forum, in which we are the only spectators and the only actors. In that field each one of us confronts himself [sic]. We carry on something of a drama. If a person retires to a secluded spot and sits down to think, he talks to himself. He asks and answers questions. He develops his ideas and organizes those ideas as he might in a conversation with somebody else. He may [in fact] prefer talking to himself to talking to somebody else. (p. 401)3

Vygotsky's general view of the relationship between inner speech and thinking can thus be applied to the realm of moral functioning/activity by understanding that when a person (child, adolescent, or adult) is faced with a moral problem, conflict, or dilemma, she responds to it by means of inner speech as inner moral dialogue—i.e., by talking through the solution to herself—just as she responds to any other problem or task with which she is faced. Moreover, following Vygotsky, we must assume that such inner moral

3 In a recently published selection of his notes, Vygotsky (1989), like Mead, explicitly considers the relationship between psychology and drama by focusing on the phenomenon of inner dialogue. He suggests that "the dynamic of the personality is drama" (p. 67), in which "passion" and "social judgment" engage in an ongoing exchange, and he argues that the roles that persons play in the inner drama emerge from "different spheres of social life" (p. 69). See also James Day's (1991) exploration of the theatrical nature of persons' inner dialogue with members of their "moral audience."
dialogue would exhibit the same “peculiar” syntactic and semantic characteristics of inner speech. Thus inner moral dialogue should consist primarily of predicates and other such abbreviated sentences, and it should stress sense over meaning, agglutination, and the kind of metonymic influx of sense that saturates single words with an overabundance of significance. All of these characteristics, moreover, should contribute to the formation of an idiomatic moral language that constitutes the primary medium for inner moral speech, and thus the means by which inner moral dialogues are conducted—similar, as such, to Oakeshott’s (1975) conception of morality as a vernacular or colloquial language.

As a brief example of the idiomatic structure of inner speech as inner moral dialogue, consider the following narrative of moral conflict and choice told by Susan, a middle-class, European-American 8-year-old who lives in the suburbs of Cleveland, OH (see Tappan, 1991b):

CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT A TIME WHEN YOU HAD TO MAKE A DECISION BUT YOU DIDN’T KNOW WHAT WAS THE RIGHT THING TO DO?

Bosssing my sister around.

BOSSING YOUR SISTER AROUND? OK, CAN YOU TELL ME SOMETHING ABOUT THAT?

Well, yeah, I do it. ’cause sometimes my grandmother and my mom and dad are gone, and she like goes in places that she’s not supposed to, and I say, “no, you’re not allowed,” and then I say to myself, before I say “okay” or “no”—then I just say to her . . . well, I say to myself first, “well, I don’t know, I’ll have to think about it” . . . and then she sits down for a while until I say something, and then I say “no,” because I don’t know where she’s going to go or something, she might even go outside.

WHEN THAT HAPPENS, AND WHEN YOU HAVE TO MAKE A DECISION ABOUT GUIDING YOUR SISTER THAT WAY, WHAT’S HARD FOR YOU IN THAT SITUATION?

Deciding what I should do, say “yes” or “no” . . . ’cause my parents might say “yes” and I might say “no,” so I mostly say “no” because I don’t know if my mom or dad would let her do that.

OKAY, CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT DO YOU USE AS SORT OF A GUIDE FOR YOURSELF WHEN YOU HAVE TO MAKE A DECISION LIKE THAT FOR YOUR SISTER? HOW DO YOU DECIDE?

Well, see, I write like a book for myself, when I have something to do and my parents go out and my grandmother—and then what I do is I just read the book and stuff and I just talk to myself a while. And then if my sister’s going to do something while I’m reading it, or something, I find the right page and I go and do what I wrote, ’cause my mother helped me to write that book.

WHAT IS THAT BOOK?

Well, it’s a book of like what I should do while my parents are gone . . . and about my sister . . .

CAN YOU TELL ME SOME OF THE THINGS IN IT?

Well, one of the things is . . . I put in there . . . “decide first what you’re going to do before you tell somebody what you think they should do or something” . . .

This excerpt illustrates well, I would argue, the fundamental ways in which language mediates Susan’s moral functioning/activity, by serving as a “tool” that she uses to respond to and solve the moral conflict she describes. Specifically, she responds to this problem through a process of inner speech as inner moral dialogue, where, as she puts it, “I say to myself, before I say ‘okay’ or ‘no.’ . . . I say to myself first, ‘well, I don’t know, I’ll have to think about it’,” and “I just read the book and stuff and I just talk to myself a while.” Moreover, this language is undeniably idiomatic—it is unclear, for example, whether the “book” Susan has written for herself is, in fact, a real book, or whether it is figurative reference to a collection of rules Susan has in her mind that she consults when deciding what to do when taking care of her sister. In any event, the predicated syntax and sense-infused semantic characteristics that Vygotsky identified as markers of inner speech are clearly present, I would argue, in Susan’s report of her own inner moral dialogue.

This dialogue, moreover, consists of an exchange between the voices of real persons (parents, grandparents, etc.) who inhabit Susan’s social world. As such, while it illustrates well the degree to which moral functioning/activity is mediated primarily through inner speech as inner moral dialogue, it also raises questions regarding the ways in which processes of social communication and social relations give rise, via the medium of language, to moral functioning/activity. It is, therefore, to a consideration of those questions that I now turn.

THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF MORAL FUNCTIONING

The notion that all higher mental functions have their origin in communicative processes and social activity is also a key element of Vygotsky’s theoretical framework (Wertsch, 1985). Recall, for example, Vygotsky’s (1934/1986) challenge to Piaget on this point: “the true direction of the development of thinking is not from the individual to the social, but from the social to the individual” (p. 36). Moreover, words, language, and forms of discourse are crucial, because they constitute the semiotic systems that are necessary for the kinds of communication, collaboration, and interaction that characterize social processes, social activity, and social interchange—processes that are internalized as intermental activities (Wertsch, 1985).6

6 Some researchers (see, for example, Wertsch, 1993) have begun to raise concerns about the use of terms like “internalize” and “internalization,” not only because of the problematic distinction between “inner” and “outer” to which such terms can give rise, but also because “internalization” can imply that the internal merely becomes a direct and simple copy of the external, rather than highlighting a process whereby what is internal is “reconstructed,” as Vygotsky (1978) argues, “and begins to occur internally” (p. 57). Wertsch (1993) suggests, therefore, that we replace “internalization” with a term like “mastery,” and that we focus attention on the “individual-acting-with-mediational-means,” so as not only to capture the fundamentally distributed nature of mind (see also Wertsch, Tulviste, & Hagstrom, 1993), but also to acknowledge “the ways in which the cultural tools that shape mediated action (including thinking and speaking) reflect institutional, cultural, and historical forces that are not under-
Vygotsky’s position on the social origins of higher mental processes is captured most succinctly in what Wertsch (1985, 1989) calls his “general genetic law of cultural development”:

Any function in the child’s cultural development appears twice, or on two planes. First it appears on the social plane, and then on the psychological plane. First it appears between people as an interpsychological category, and then within the child as an intrapsychological category. . . We may consider this position as a law in the full sense of the word, but it goes without saying that internalization transforms the process itself and changes its structure and functions. Social relations or relations among people genetically underlie all higher functions and their relationships. (Vygotsky, 1981a, p. 163)

As such, from a Vygotskian perspective, moral development must entail the internalization of semiotically and linguistically mediated social relations, as external speech between persons becomes inner speech within persons—that is, as overt, external dialogue becomes silent, inner dialogue. Children first begin to learn from parents, grandparents, caregivers, and even older siblings about social rules, standards of behavior, and the effect of their actions on others’ feelings in the second year of life (Dunn, 1987). Moreover, this learning occurs primarily in the context of conversation, as adults and children begin to talk with each other about “right” and “wrong,” “good” and “bad,” “should” and “shouldn’t” (Snow, 1987). As a result of these communicative interactions over the course of a number of years, therefore, what is initially communication-for-others regarding rules, standards, and the consequences of their transgression gradually becomes communication-withoneself regarding what one should and should not do in a given situation: “in inner speech culturally prescribed forms of language and reasoning find their individualized realization . . . as culturally sanctioned symbolic systems are remodeled into individualized verbal thought” (Kozulin, 1986, p. xxxvi). Children, in other words, do not simply make internal what was once external, but gradually create their own internal plane of moral thinking, feeling, and acting, based on their experiences in the social world.

A clear description of this process at work in the preschool context has been provided by Cary Buzzelli (1993), based on his studies of the ways in which children internalize moral norms, and then use these norms to guide their own behavior. That is, Buzzelli employs a Vygotskian analysis to illuminate how interpersonal dialogue between children and teachers is transformed into inner dialogue that children use for “self-regulation”:

standable solely from the perspective of the role they play in [individual] psychological processes” (p. 170). While I am, by and large, sympathetic to these concerns, I am not sure I am ready to jettison the concept of “internalization”—“the process by which the social becomes the psychological” (Tharp & Gallimore, 1988, p. 29)—completely (see Tappan, 1997).

An important part of children’s moral understanding is formed through dialogue with adults who interpret and frame events and rules within a moral context that reflects their own unique perspective. . . [T]his process is a social one influenced by the words adults use in their dialogue with children. For example a child may take another child’s toy. The adult may tell the child that taking the toy is stealing and that it is wrong, or that it is against school rules, or that the child missing the item will be upset. Each of these explanations describes the behavior in a different way using different words thereby giving the action a different meaning. For example, the teacher might ask the child ‘Is that toy yours?’ ‘Who does it belong to?’ ‘Did you take it?’ ‘What is the rule about taking things that belong to others?’ Another teacher may approach the situation differently by asking ‘Where did you get that toy?’ ‘Did you find it?’ ‘Does it belong to another child?’ ‘What does it mean to take a toy that belongs to someone else?’ ‘How do you think the other child feels?’ In the second example each question asked is based upon the child’s response to the previous question. The two examples represent different types of questioning within adult-child dialogue. It is through such interactions, by questioning and responding, that adult and child create a shared meaning of the behavior which serves as the basis for the child’s moral norm concerning the behavior. (p. 383)

Buzzelli also argues, following Bakhtin’s (1981) dialogic account of authorship, that encouraging children to “retell” moral rules in their own words, rather than simply to “recite” them by heart (using the words of adults—parents or teachers), provides the basis for a more positive type of moral self-regulation (see also Tappan, 1991a).

In sum, then, a Vygotskian perspective on moral development suggests that because language is the social medium par excellence, processes of social communication and social relations necessarily give rise to moral functioning/activity. Social interaction, however, always takes place in the context of culture, because words, language, and forms of discourse are inherently sociocultural phenomena. Thus I turn, finally, to a consideration of the ways in which moral development is necessarily shaped by the particular social, cultural, and historical context in which it occurs.

THE SOCIOCULTURAL SITUATEDNESS OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

The assumption that there is a fundamental connection between human mental functioning and the social, cultural, and historical contexts in which it occurs follows directly from the central tenets of Vygotsky’s theoretical framework (Wertsch, 1985, 1991). Recall, in this regard, his claim that “thought development is determined by language, i.e., by the linguistic tools of thought and by the sociocultural experience of the child” (Vygotsky, 1934/1986, p. 94), and his argument that with the onset of inner speech and verbal thought in early childhood comes a dramatic shift in the nature of development, “from biological to sociohistorical . . . [because] verbal thought is not an innate, natural form of behavior, but is determined by a historical-cultural process and has specific properties and laws that cannot be found in the natural forms of thought and speech.” (p. 94)
Perhaps, however, because of his untimely early death, Vygotsky never directly addressed many of the critical issues to which these assumptions, claims, and arguments give rise—that is, since his own analyses did not move beyond the level of interspsychological processes, "he did little to spell out how specific historical, cultural, and institutional settings are tied to various forms of mediated action" (Wertsch, 1991, p. 46). Nevertheless, as Wertsch (1991) suggests, a genuinely "sociocultural approach to mind" can be developed quite easily on the basis of Vygotsky's theoretical insights:

In order to formulate a more comprehensive sociocultural approach to mental functioning one should identify historically, culturally, and institutionally situated forms of mediated [interpersonal] action and specify how their mastery leads to particular forms of mediated action on the intramental plane. This amounts to extending Vygotsky's ideas to bring the sociocultural situatedness of mediated action on the interpersonal plane to the fore. It is the sociocultural situatedness of mediated action that provides the essential link between the cultural, historical, and institutional setting on the one hand and the mental functioning of the individual on the other. (p. 49)

From a Vygotskian perspective, therefore, moral development is necessarily shaped by social, cultural, historical, and institutional forces, because the various forms of interspsychological functioning that give rise to intrapsychological processes of moral functioning/activity are mediated by words, language, and forms of discourse that are similarly shaped and situated. Thus the words that a young child uses to help her understand that her actions are "right" or "wrong," "good" or "bad," come out of a specific social, cultural, and linguistic milieu. Moreover, the types of conversations and interactions in which parents and children engage around standards and their transgression are always culturally and historically determined:

According to Schieffelin's [1979] descriptions of mother-child interaction among the Kaluli [for example], parents talk very little about the child's feelings and are unwilling to work hard (as American mothers do, using expansions and clarification requests) to ascertain the child's intentions when these are unclearly expressed . . . [because] the Kaluli would see such behavior as inappropriate, in violation of their belief that we cannot know others' intentions unless they tell us. Thus, Kaluli children evidently do not have maternal discussion of their own and others' feelings as a resource when they encounter the problem space of moral understanding. How do they resolve issues of what constitutes kindness versus cruelty? How do Kaluli children develop empathy as a basis for moral understanding? It is interesting to note that, consonant with their unwillingness to interpret unclear intentions, the Kaluli relate the seriousness of a moral transgression not to the intention of the transgressor but rather to the enormity of the consequence [Schieffelin & Ochs, 1983]. (Snow, 1987, p. 114)

Debate about the degree to which moral development, particularly Kohlberg's (1981, 1984) sequence of six structurally defined stages of reasoning about justice and fairness, is cross-culturally universal (rather than culturally specific) is ongoing within the field (see Boyes & Walker, 1988; Dien, 1982; Shweder & Much, 1987; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Snarey, 1985). Much of this debate centers around whether observed cultural differences in moral judgments represent differences in content (allowed by Kohlberg) or structure (assumed, by Kohlberg, to be universal) (see Blasi, 1987).

Of particular interest for my purposes here is a recent study by Ann Huebner and Andrew Garrod (1991, 1993) of the moral reasoning of adolescent and young-adult Tibetan Buddhist monks. Huebner and Garrod interviewed 20 monks living in a Tibetan Buddhist monastery in Nepal using a "culturally adapted" form of Kohlberg's hypothetical Moral Judgment Interview (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). While Huebner and Garrod (1993) were able to chart a standard age-related developmental progression in moral judgment among the monks they interviewed (movement from a mean stage of 2/3 for the young adolescent group to a mean stage of 3/4 for the young adults), they found that it was very difficult to interpret the monks' moral reasoning using scoring categories provided by Kohlberg's scheme, largely because the notion of "karma" was so central to the Buddhist philosophy and to the worldview of the monks with whom they talked. As a result, Huebner and Garrod (1991) argue, quite forcefully, for the importance of sociocultural sensitivity in the study of moral development:

In order to map the moral domain of a culture, we must first understand that culture . . . through [its] own history, philosophy, and language. Indeed, the importance of language has been sorely neglected by moral reasoning researchers. More is needed than simply a researcher's ability to collect data in subjects' native language, or even the understanding of "foreign" concepts (such as karma) that can be brought into our system by the addition of a single new word to our lexicon. We must strive, too, to understand concepts . . . that cannot be captured in direct word-for-word translation. (p. 350)

If, therefore, morality is not a naturally occurring universal concept, but is dependent on words, language, and forms of discourse that are socioculturally specific (like "karma"),


8 Similarly, Dien (1982) argues that Kohlberg's theory cannot be used to understand Chinese moral experience, because Kohlberg's theory and method both instantiate "the prevailing Western conception of man [sic] as an autonomous being, free to make choices and determine his destiny" (p. 339). As such, Kohlberg's approach adequately captures neither "the Confucian view of man as an integral part of an orderly universe with an innate moral sense to maintain harmony," nor the preferred mode of conflict resolution in China, which focuses on "reconciliation and collective decision making rather than individual choice, commitment, and responsibility" (p. 331).

9 From a Vygotskian perspective, I would argue, the concept of "karma" in the Buddhist tradition is significant not only because it represents an external symbol that has specific religious and/or moral meaning, but also because it functions as a predicated semiotic tool—part of a vernacular moral language—for thinking, feeling, and acting, whose sense is shared by those who share the same cultural activities. Thus, as Huebner and Garrod's (1991, 1993)
as the result of a constructive process undertaken by a transcendental epistemological subject (Kohlberg’s view), but rather must be seen as the outcome of social communication and social interaction between speaking persons that occurs in specific social, cultural, and historical contexts. This, I would argue, is a central tenet of a Vygotskian perspective on moral development.

CONCLUSION

In this essay I have sketched the outlines of an explicitly sociocultural perspective on the study of moral development. Grounded in Vygotsky’s (1934/1986) studies of inner speech and its relationship to the development of thinking, this perspective extends Vygotsky’s insights about the semiotic mediation of the mental functioning via inner speech (and inner dialogue), the social origins of higher psychological functioning, and the sociocultural situatedness of human development into the realm of moral development. As such, it gives rise to a very different account of the process of moral development than that offered by other theoretical perspectives currently en vogue in the field—most notably, the cognitive-developmental paradigm (see Kohlberg, 1969, 1981, 1984; Piaget, 1932/1965; Rest, 1979; Turiel, 1983).

I began this essay with questions about origins and questions about differences—questions that lie at the heart of current debates in the field of moral development. Thus, in conclusion, let me return to those questions, briefly, to indicate some of the ways in which I think a Vygotskian perspective on moral development helps to illuminate and answer them.

First, regarding the origins of moral functioning/activity, while Vygotsky clearly considered both nature and culture to play central roles in ontogenesis, he focused his primary attention on exploring the social/cultural dimension (Wertsch, 1985). From a Vygotskian perspective, therefore, moral functioning/activity must be understood to originate as part of the dynamics of internalization, as social interactions that occur via the medium of language become intrapersonal psychic processes that manifest themselves as inner speech. Moreover, because moral action is necessarily mediated action, genuinely moral functioning/activity can not occur until a child has access to the words-as-tools that she can use to interpret her actions, and the actions of others, as “good” or “bad,” “right” or “wrong,” etc. Thus moral development and language development go hand-in-hand, from this perspective, and the development of the unique syntactic and semantic characteristics of inner speech, in particular, offers an important gauge with which to measure the developmental progress of moral functioning/activity.

Second, regarding differences in moral functioning/activity, Vygotsky clearly considered differences between persons—for example, differences in reasoning or problem-solving ability—not to be indicators of developmental successes or failures, measured against a universal standard, but rather to be manifestations of the particular, and necessarily differential, effects of sociocultural setting on mediated action (Wertsch, 1991). From a Vygotskian perspective, therefore, moral development does not occur in the same way, following the same sequence, for all persons around the globe, but rather it is specific to unique social, cultural, and historical contexts. Moreover, these unique sociocultural settings may well occur within the confines of a larger society—like the contemporary U.S.—defined, as such, by those who share similar experiences, values, or social, political, and/or economic assumptions. Thus, from this perspective, gender, racial, cultural, or socioeconomic differences in moral development, and in the forms of moral functioning/activity, exhibited by members of different sociocultural groups, are to be expected, and they must be treated as differences, not deviations, by researchers and theoreticians alike.

A Vygotskian perspective on the study of moral development also gives rise to a number of important empirical questions. These include questions about the particular syntactic and semantic characteristics of inner moral dialogue, and the degree to which these correspond to Vygotsky’s characterization of the syntactic and semantic “peculiarities” of inner speech; questions about the relationship between children’s inner moral dialogues and the external interactions and conversations from which they arise; and related questions about the ways in which the activities of adults and more competent peers encourage children to move through Vygotsky’s (1978) “Zone of Proximal Development,” from their actual level of moral functioning/activity to their potential developmental level (see also Moll, 1990; Rogoff & Wertsch, 1984). This last set of questions, moreover, clearly calls for more work, both empirical and theoretical, regarding how to assess developmental levels of moral functioning/activity in a way that both avoids the universal standards that have traditionally been employed to chart developmental progress, and yet provides some means by which distinctions can be drawn between different types/forms/manifestations of moral functioning/activity. Not an easy task, to say the least.

Perhaps the most important empirical question from a Vygotskian perspective, however, concerns the issue of motivation—that is, what is the motivation for children, adolescents, and adults to engage in genuinely moral action? Vygotsky (1934/1986) raised the question of the relationship be-

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30 Dunn (1987) provides interesting data regarding parent-child communicative interactions that are relevant to this question. She reports high correlations between the frequency of maternal talk about feelings to 18-month-olds and subsequent talk about inner states by these children at 24 months. As Snow (1987) suggests, these correlations contrast with the generally low correlations reported between syntactic characteristics of maternal and child speech: “parents may influence what their children say,” Snow argues, “more powerfully than how they say it” (p. 115; emphasis added).
between motivation and thought himself, arguing that the final step in the analysis of the inner planes of verbal thought leads beyond thinking to feeling and willing:

Thought is not the superior authority in this process. Thought is not begotten by thought; it is engendered by motivation, i.e., by our desires and needs, our interests and emotions. Behind every thought there is an affective-volitional tendency, which holds the answer to the last “why” in the analysis of thinking. A true and full understanding of another’s thought is possible only when we understand its affective-volitional basis. (p. 252)

In the study of moral development, therefore, we must move beyond an exclusive focus on cognition (see Kohlberg, 1981, 1984), toward a conception of moral functioning that captures the complex inter-relationship among the cognitive, affective, and volitional dimensions of moral life (see Tappan, 1990). Finally, I would argue that a Vygotskian or sociocultural perspective, like the one I have sketched above, offers a distributed, collective, shared, fundamentally social view of moral development that stands in stark contrast to the individualistic, atomistic, isolated, fundamentally psychological view that has dominated the field for the past century. Many have argued for such a shift in emphasis in recent years, from a variety of different disciplines (see, for example, Burbules, 1993; Gergen, 1991; Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Hermans, Kempen, & van Loon, 1992; Packer, 1985; Sampson, 1993a, 1993b; Sandel, 1982; Walzer, 1987; Wertsch, 1991). By linking Vygotsky’s insights about semiotic mediation and the social origins of mind to a fundamentally dialogic conception of the moral self (see Day & Tappan, 1996), we can begin to forge the theoretical framework for a communal or shared vision of moral development—a vision that can, and must, guide the study of moral development, and the practice of moral education, into the 21st century.

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