Philosophy
of
LanguageHow does language work? How does it connect with the world? What about fictional stories: what are they about? What is the relation between meaning and truth-or-falsity? Is metaphorical meaning something different from literal meaning, or can all metaphors be translated without loss of meaning into literal language? Can all languages be translated into one another, or could there be a completely untranslatable language? How does language connect with thought? Do we think in a language? Could we think without one? Is it possible to have thoughts that cannot be expressed in language? What sorts of things are "meanings"? Is there any conceptual connection between the meaning of language and the meaning of life? How are even the most complex languages so easily learned by small children? Is there an innate tendency to language, or an innate receptivity to the rules of grammar? Is there a "universal grammar" for all languages?
As these questions show, language is an extraordinarily complex phenomenon. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that languages consist of very many enormously complex phenomena. Philosophy of language is at the juncture of a number of disciplines: psychology, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, cognitive science, semiotics, literary criticism, and, to be sure, traditional philosophy and logic. The boundaries cannot be drawn clearly. Nor should they be, because the phenomena in question are so multi-faceted that only a multi-perspectival approach could yield a sufficiently appreciative understanding of them.
For much of the 20
th century, philosophy of language occupied a central position on the philosophical agenda. The century began with the "Linguistic Turn," a methodological orientation that operated from the assumption that many philosophical problems are by-products of language, which is, of course, the vehicle we have to use to solve them. Understanding how languages work was thought to hold the key to making real progress in philosophy. The fundamental insight behind this is that there can be no philosophical answers until we have the questions right, and we cannot get the questions right until we understand language.The first part of the course will focus on some of the technical accomplishments of the early philosophers of language in the 20
th century as they tried to work out the details of how our words connect with the world. The theoretical vocabularies that were developed for examining the notions of reference, meaning, and truth became the springboard for more general theories about language as a communicative phenomenon. In the end, investigation of the logical structure of languages -- formal syntax — could not be separated from research into linguistic content — semantics — which in turn entailed attention to how languages are used — pragmatics.Once the conceptual foundations are in place, we will be able to turn to some topics of special interest: metaphors and fictions. Some philosophers of language thought they could dismiss metaphors as inessential stylistic frills that were unnecessary for the scientific task of describing the world. Others regarded them as abnormal uses of language to be explained as deviations from the norm, perhaps with some pragmatic value, but ultimately without any real cognitive significance. A closer look at actual linguistic practice, however, reveals that metaphors are ubiquitous. They are linguistic commonplaces, both easy to use and easy to understand. At the same time, it is quite mysterious as to how. The tools that were developed and used to analyze "normal" assertions will be deployed to explain metaphors.
Fiction presents additional problems. If reference is necessary for meaning, then how can fiction have any meaning at all? There is, after all, no real Harry Potter, but the words in Rowling’s stories still make sense. Even if reference is required only for truth and not for meaning, there are still questions to answer: How can it be true to say that Harry was a wizard, false to say he lived in Paris, but neither true nor false to say that he preferred cider to lemonade? More troubling still, and semantics aside, how can a non-existent Harry Potter be a meaningful part of anyone’s life?
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The written requirements for the course will include several short assignments, a mid-term, and a final. The oral requirements will include brief class presentations, in addition to regular class participation.
The main, and required, textbook for the course is:
A. P. Martinich, The Philosophy of Language, 4
This will be complemented by reserve readings at Miller Library and several handouts.
Daniel Cohen
Email: dhcohen@colby.edu Office: Lovejoy 247
Extension: 3427 Office hours: MW, 9:00-11:00,
and by appointment
Philosophy of Language
Tentative (and perhaps overly optimistic) Class Schedule
date Topic/Reading [
Location]Sept. 4 Introduction: Why should there be a philosophy of language?
I. Reference, Truth, and Meaning
How do words connect with the world? What in the world are we talking about when we talk about Santa Claus, or use other ‘non-denoting’ singular terms? How do meaning and truth relate? What sorts of things are ‘meanings’?
Sept. 9 -11 Augustine: De Magistre; [
Handout]J. Locke: "Of Words" [M] J. S. Mill: "Of Names" [M]
Sept. 16-18 G. Frege: "On Sense and Nominatum" [M]
B. Russell: "On Denoting" [M]
P. F. Strawson: "On Referring" [M]
B. Russell: "Mr. Strawson on Referring" [M]
K. Donnellan: "Reference and Definite Descriptions" [M]
Sept. 23-25 C. Hempel: "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance" [M]
J. Searle: "Proper Names" [M]
S. Kripke: "Naming and Necessity" [M]
Sept. 30- H. Putnam: "Meaning and Reference" [M]
Oct. 2 D. Davidson: "Truth and Meaning" [M]
S. Kripke: "A Puzzle About Belief" [M]
II. Pragmatics and Semantics
What is meaning? Are there different kinds of meaning or ways to mean? Can ‘speaker-meaning’ and ‘word-meaning’ differ? How does the pragmatic dimension of making an assertion enter into the overall meaning?
Oct. 7-9 H. P. Grice: "Meaning" [M]
J. L. Austin: "Performative Utterances" [M]
J. R. Searle: "The Structure of Illocutionary Acts" [M]
Oct. 16 H. P. Grice: "Logic and Conversation" [M]
W. V. Quine: "Meaning" [M]
D. Davidson: "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" [M]
Oct. 21-23 N. Chomsky: "Language and the Problem of Knowledge" [M]
J. Cook: "Wittgenstein on Privacy" [M]
S. Kripke: "On Rules and Private Language" [M]
Oct. 28-30 Review and Midterm Exam
III. Literal and Metaphorical Meaning
What are the semantics--and pragmatics--of metaphor? How do we recognize, interpret, and evaluate metaphors? Can metaphors be true (false)?
Nov. 4-6 M. Johnson: "Metaphor in the Philosophical Tradition" [J]
M. Black: "Metaphor" [J]
N. Goodman: "Metaphor as Moonlighting" [J]
I. Loewenberg: "Identifying Metaphor" [J]
Nov. 11-13 D. Davidson: "What Metaphors Mean" [M]
A. P. Martinich: "A Theory for Metaphor" [M]
J. R. Searle: "Metaphor" [J]
M. Hesse: "The Explanatory Function of Metaphor" [
Reserve]Nov. 18 D. Novitz: "Metaphor, Derrida, and Davidson" [
Reserve]R. Rorty: "Unfamiliar Noises: Hesse and Davidson…" [Reserve]
D. Cohen: "Schoolhouses, Jailhouses…" [
Reserve]V. Philosophy and Other Fictions
What is the ‘meaning’ of a work of fiction? What semantic and pragmatic factors need to be taken into account? What makes this kind of meaning ‘meaningful’ in the value-theoretic sense?
Nov. 20-25 J. Borges: "The Quixote of Pierre Menard" [
Reserve]A. Danto: "Philosophy As/And/Of Literature" [Reserve]
D. Lewis: "Truth in Fiction" [
Reserve] K. Walton: "How Remote Are Possible Worlds?" [Reserve]R. Rorty: "Is There a Problem about Fictional Discourse?" [
Reserve]Dec 2-4 Paper Presentations and Sundry Conclusions
Texts
[M] = A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). [Required Text]
[J] = M. Johnson, ed., Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981) [On Reserve, Miller Library]
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PL338 — Philosophy of Language:
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