PL135 - Puzzles & Paradoxes:

An Introduction to Philosophy

Philosophy is a most peculiar area of inquiry, to the point that there are good reasons for thinking it really isn’t a single area of inquiry at all, but rather an odd combination of several areas. All of the following questions count as philosophical, but it is hard to see what, if anything, they all have in common.

* What is the meaning of life? Is it the same for everyone? Does life even have a meaning? How could we find out?

* What are minds? How do they relate to brains? Can computers think?

* Do scientific change, cultural relativity, differences in perspective, and human limitations mean that we can never really know anything?

* How should I live my life? What is the right thing to do? Are there objective rights and wrongs? How could we find out?

* Is there a God? Is there an afterlife? How could we find out?

* What makes an object a piece of art? What makes a work of art good or bad art? Is it just a matter of personal preference?

* Do numbers exist? What sorts of things are numbers? Are mathematical truths all provable? Are mathematical truths necessarily true?

* What is the best form of government? What criteria should we use in deciding what the best form of government would be?

* Are there principles of good reasoning that apply in all areas of intellectualinquiry? If so, what are they? Can they be systematized?

Perhaps a good start is that, as Aristotle wrote, Philosophy begins in wonder. The myriad debates and dialogues that constitute philosophy may have little else in common but they do have this. Moreover, we can wonder about anything — from the immensity of the cosmos, to human dignity despite that immensity; from the mysteries of the universe to the mystery of life; from the beauty found in mathematics to the precision found in music; and from the profundity of great literature to the cleverness of a good joke. Sometimes the wonder of it all is hard to see, but it can all be wonderful, if we can get the right mind-frame about it.

Many philosophical problems have an air of paradox. These conceptual tangles sometimes seem to be of our own making, and more in need of dissolution or resolution, than simple solution. In this course, we will examine an assortment of paradoxes, dilemmas, and puzzles with several ends in mind. First, by examining some of the more playful problems that have concerned philosophers, we can develop strategies that can be applied to other, more complicated and pressing philosophical problems. Second, to untangle these knots, we will need to master some of philosophy’s standard logical and conceptual resources. Third, perhaps we can learn something about the nature of philosophy from these peculiarly philosophical problems. And last, but by no means least, we should have some fun.

The topics we will address in this course are only a small sample of the spectrum of philosophical questions. The areas on which we will focus include:

logic and language,

personal identity,

rational decision theory,

skepticism and knowledge.

Our discussions will fall largely within three of the major sub-fields of Philosophy: Epistemology, Logic, and Metaphysics. Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. It deals with such questions as whether knowledge is possible, what counts as knowledge, and how such concepts as belief, knowledge, truth, and rationality are related. Logic is the study of rational inference. It too is concerned with truth and rationality insofar as those concepts connect with questions about the consistency and consequences of our beliefs. Metaphysics is the study of ultimate reality, including such questions as what really exists and what makes something the same over time. These areas are not independent, nor are they independent of other areas in philosophy, such as philosophy of language, ethics, philosophy of science, aesthetics, political philosophy, and philosophy of religion.

We will also venture into the field of Meta-philosophy, asking questions about philosophy. Is philosophy a science or an art? What is the proper method for philosophy? How does philosophy relate to psychology, physics, sociology, and other disciplines? Oddly, meta-philosophy is part of philosophy. When we raise "meta-questions" about other disciplines, we leave those disciplines behind and enter philosophy. For example, the questions "Do numbers exist independent of thought?" and "What is the nature of mathematical knowledge?" are not mathematical questions. They are philosophical. Meta-philosophy, however, is part of philo-sophy. There is something peculiar about that kind of self-reference — whether it is thought thinking about itself or language speaking about itself. It is characteristic of philosophy. And, as we shall see, it is characteristic of many kinds of paradox.

The required the texts for the course are:

A course pack of readings (CP).

Gilbert Ryle’s Dilemmas.

Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett’s The Mind’s I (H&D).

Robert M. Martin’s There Are Two Errors in the the Title of This Book.

These will be supplemented by various handouts and reserve readings. Grades will be based on class participation, exams, quizzes, and other written assignments.

Daniel Cohen

dhcohen@colby.edu

Office: Lovejoy 247

Ext.: 3427

Office Hours: M-W-F, 8:00-9:00; 10:00-11:00

 

Puzzles and Paradoxes

A tentative schedule of topics and readings

Introduction: Paradoxical Philosophy

Feb. 5 - 7 Introduction: What is Philosophy?

Nature of Philosophical Questions and Philosophical Methodology

Readings: R. Nozick, excerpt from Philosophical Explanations (CP)

W. V. Quine, "The Ways of Paradox" (CP)

G. Ryle, Dilemmas, chapter 1

Martin, There are Two Errors… , chapter I.

Philosophical Paradoxes

Feb. 10 — 21 Logic as a Philosophical Methodology:

On Liars Paradoxes, Incomplete Situations, Paradoxes of

Self-Reference, and Other Non-empirical Questions

Readings: Gardner, "The Unexpected Hanging…" (CP)

G. Ryle, Dilemmas, chapters 6 and 8

Martin, There are Two Errors… , chapters V-VI

Paradoxes and Parables

Feb. 24 - 28 Fiction as a Philosophical Methodology:\ Thought-experiments and the Meaning of Fiction

Readings: Walton, "How Remote are Fictional Worlds…?" (CP)

Nozick, "Fiction" (H&D)

Martin, There are Two Errors… , chapter XVII.

Practical Paradoxes

Feb. 24 - 28 Free Will and Agency; Fatalism and Determinism

Readings: G. Ryle, Dilemmas, ch. 2 — "It Was To Be."

W. James, "The Dilemma of Determinism" [H/R]

Smullyan, "Is God a Taoist?" (H&D)

Martin, There are Two Errors… , chapter III-VI; XIV-XVI..

Mar. 3 — 10 Rational Choice; Intention and Action

Readings: Kavka, "The Toxin Puzzle" (CP)

Hofstadter: "The Prisoner’s Dilemma" (CP)

Kavka, "Some Paradoxes of Deterrence" (CP)

Mar. 12 — 14 Review and Midterm

Personal Paradoxes

Mar. 17 - 21 Paradoxes of Identity: Who, What, and Where Am I?

Readings: Introduction (H&D, pp. 3-16)

Borges, "Borges and I" (H&D, pp. 19-22)

Descartes, Second Meditation [H/R]

Smullyan, "The Unfortunate Dualist" (H&D)

Dennett, "Where Am I?" (H&D)

Sanford, "Where Was I?" (H&D)

Mar. 31 - Apr. 4 .Minds, Programs, Persons

Readings: Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" (H&D)

Hofstadter, "The Turing Test" (H&D)

Nagel, "What Is It Like to be a Bat?" (H&D)

Searle. "Minds, Brains, and Programs" (H&D)

Martin, There are Two Errors… , chapter XII.

Apr. 7 - 11 Constructing the Self

Readings: Appiah, "But Would That Still Be Me?" (CP)

Martin, There are Two Errors… , chapter XIII.

Skepticism, Knowledge & Rationality

Apr. 14 - 18 Skepticism

Readings: Ryle, Dilemmas, Chapter 5 and 7

Descartes, First Meditation [H/R]

Unger, "A Classical Form of Skepticism" [H/R]

Smullyan, "An Epistemological Nightmare" (H&D))

Martin, There are Two Errors… , chapter II.

Apr. 21 - 25 Rational belief

Readings: Pascal’s Wager [H/R]

James, "The Will to Believe" [H/R]

Martin, There are Two Errors… , chapters I, VII.

Apr. 28 - May 2 Induction

Readings: Hume &c. [H/R]

Martin, There are Two Errors… , chapter IX-X.

An Infinity of Problems

May. 5 - 9 An Infinity of Problems from Zeno, Hilbert, and Cantor

Readings: Handouts

Ryle, Dilemmas, chapter 3.

Martin, There are Two Errors… , chapter VIII.